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Giles: How to Claim a Gene: Application of the Patent Disclosure Require

HOW TO CLAIM A GENE: APPLICATION OF THE
PATENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS TO
GENETIC SEQUENCES
Patrick Brian Giles*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1980, the only source of insulin for diabetics was the
pancreas of animals, such as cows or pigs.1 While supply was not a
problem, this source did carry the risk of infection and allergic
reaction.2 Other therapeutic proteins, such as growth hormone, were
previously only available in minuscule amounts from the pituitary
glands of human cadavers.3 However, by 1980 the emerging field of
biotechnology provided methods for producing mass quantities of
human proteins such as insulin and growth hormone using the science
of genetic engineering.4 These laboratory methods generally involve
inserting a gene5 that encodes the desired therapeutic protein into a
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) vector.6 The product of this “DNA
recombination” is then introduced to appropriate cells, the cells are
cultured in the laboratory, during which time the cells produce the

∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law; Ph.D.; registered patent agent.
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Tests Begin on
Insulin Synthesized from Bacteria Through Gene-Splicing, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1980, at D18; Cristine
Russell, FDA Approves Insulin Made by Splicing Genes, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1982, at A6.
2. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562; Tests Begin on Insulin Synthesized from Bacteria Through GeneSplicing, supra note 1, at D18; Russell, supra note 1, at A6.
3. See, e.g., Sandra Blakeslee, Supply of Growth Hormone Brings Hope for New Uses, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1987, at C1.
4. See supra notes 1–3; CYNTHIA ROBBINS-ROTH, FROM ALCHEMY TO IPO 11 (Perseus Publishing
2000).
5. Gregor Mendel was the first to appreciate that certain traits, such as flower color, do not blend in
offspring, but are instead inherited based on the passage of a discrete factor, later termed a “gene,” to the
offspring from both the mother and the father. It is now known that these genes are discrete segments of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which contain instructions for producing functional units, such as
proteins. See generally Mark B. Gerstein et al., What is a Gene, Post-ENCODE? History and Updated
Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669–81 (2007).
6. See HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 176–98 (6th ed. 2008), for a
description of many of the principles involved in molecular biology and recombinant DNA technology.
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recombinant protein along side their natural proteins, and the
recombinant protein is then collected and purified.7
Not surprisingly, biotechnology companies have sought patent
protection for these novel genes and their uses.8 Of course, these
efforts are futile if a competitor can circumvent the patent by making
changes to the claimed DNA sequence while preserving, or possibly
improving, the therapeutic efficacy of the encoded protein.9 In fact, a
competitor can routinely engineer non-naturally occurring variants
using one of many recombinant techniques.10 Notably, in some cases,
50% or more of the amino acid positions within the sequence of a
protein can be substituted without substantially altering protein
function.11 Inventors of novel genes and recombinant technologies,
therefore, have sought patent protection beyond the scope of the
specific genetic sequence they exemplified.12 While this can be done
by specifically reciting each and every possible alternative sequence,
to do so would be impractical.13 Instead, it is far more feasible to
refer to the gene generically (e.g., by name or function), thereby
describing a genus of genetic sequences covered by the claim.14 The
7. Id. at 194–96.
8. Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the Role
of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 215, 221–22 (2009)
[hereinafter Holman, Learning from Litigation] (noting the early “belief that patent protection could
prove critical in providing the necessary incentive for the development of drugs based on newly
identified human genes”).
9. Id. at 226–27 (“[A] form of human insulin with a single amino acid change . . . renders the
product faster acting than native insulin.”).
10. Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified Version of the BLAST Score as a
Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of Related Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 60 (2004) [hereinafter Holman, Protein Similarity Score]
(noting that it is routine to make mutations in a protein and screen those mutants for one that retains the
desired function).
11. Id. at 59.
12. Id. at 57.
13. A protein is a polymer of amino acids linked together in a chain. See id. at 72 n.70. There are
twenty different amino acids to choose from for each position in that chain. Id. Thus, for a typical
protein having three hundred amino acids residues, there are nineteen alternative amino acids at each of
the three hundred positions. Id. Using the equation ((19 x 300) + (19 x 300)(19 x 299)), this results in
over thirty-two million possible protein variants that have a single amino acid change. See id.
14. When an aspect of an invention includes one of multiple alternative embodiments, a generic term
may be used to represent each of those alternatives. ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF
PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 6:9 (6th ed. 2008). For example, the term “mammal” represents a genus
encompassing the species mice and humans. See id. Note that the genus can also cover a subgenus. Id.
For example, “rodents” is a genus covering mice and rats, but it is also a sub-genus of mammals. See id.
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problem, however, is that an overreaching genus claim may not
satisfy the patent disclosure requirements codified in the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112,15 which (according to the most current
interpretation of the statute)16 requires that the disclosure (1) contain
an adequate written description of the invention; (2) enable one to
make and use the invention; and (3) disclose the inventor’s best mode
for carrying out his invention.17
Prior to 1997, the courts relied primarily on the enablement
requirement to invalidate overreaching claims.18 However, in Regents
of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,19 a court, for the
first time, invalidated an original—arguably overreaching—claim for
lack of written description.20 Specifically, the Lilly court concluded
that the patentee’s description of the rat insulin DNA sequence was
not a sufficient disclosure to support claims to vertebrate,
mammalian, or human insulin DNA.21 As a consequence, inventors
have had to find other ways to describe and claim genetic sequences
in a manner that would cover predictable variants while at the same
time not running afoul of the Lilly written description requirement.

15. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.”).
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. Under § 112, first paragraph, as enacted as part of the Patent Act of 1952, the inventor must
adequately set forth and describe three items: (1) the invention (the description requirement); (2) the
manner and process of making and using the invention (the enablement requirement); and (3) the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (the best mode requirement). 3
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (2010).
18. E.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (arguing that an inventor should be
allowed to dominate future patentable inventions based on his teachings so long as the scope of the
claims “bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification”); see
also Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment
of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 12
(2007) [hereinafter Holman, Paper Tiger] (noting that prior to Lilly, the enablement requirement was
sufficiently robust to limit patent claims “to a scope commensurate with the inventor’s disclosure”).
19. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
20. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4.
21. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568.
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One approach taken by inventors,22 and originally endorsed by the
Patent Office,23 was the claiming a genus of genetic sequences based
on percent identity24 to a reference sequence—generally the naturally
occurring gene—that is limited by a functional limitation.25 However,
the Patent Office has recently reversed its position26 and proposed
that inclusion of a functional limitation, which narrows the genus of
genetic sequences to those that produce a functional protein (e.g.,
“wherein the polypeptide has activity X”), actually increases the
burden on the specification to satisfy the written description
requirement by disclosing a correlation between structure and
function.27 This reversal in the application of the written description
22. According to a search of the USTPO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, forty-one U.S.
patents filed prior to 2000 and fifty-six U.S. patents filed between the years 2000 and 2007 were issued
with the phrases “percent identity” and “SEQ ID NO” in the claims. USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image
Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html.
23. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REVISED INTERIM WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS, 53–55 (1999), http://web.archive.org/
web/20070101024139/http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/writtendesc.pdf [hereinafter INTERIM
TRAINING MATERIALS] (superseded). Example 14 of the Interim Training Materials suggested that a
description of a protein isolated from liver having the sequence SEQ ID NO: 3 and shown to catalyze
the reaction of A to B without exemplification of any variants with this activity nonetheless would
satisfy the written description requirement for a claim reciting “[a] protein having SEQ ID NO: 3 and
variants thereof that are at least 95% identical to SEQ ID NO: 3 and catalyze the reaction of A [to] B.”
Id. at 53–55.
24. Percent sequence identity refers to the percentage of nucleic acid or amino acid residues within a
given DNA or protein, respectively, that are identical to the reference sequence. See Holman, Protein
Similarity Score, supra note 10, at 69. For example, a protein is essentially a biopolymer composed of
amino acids in a specific order. Id. at 58–59. Thus, for a protein that is one hundred amino acids in
length, one can substitute amino acids at five of the positions and still be at least 95% identical to the
natural protein. See id. at 69–73. Moreover, there are twenty different amino acids in humans, so each
position on the protein chain can be substituted with one of nineteen different amino acids. Id. at 59.
These include conservative and non-conservative substitutions, which are not reflected in the percent
identity. See id. at 73.
25. A functional limitation limits the claimed genetic sequences to those that are able to perform a
recited function, thereby excluding from the claim non-functional variants that would fail to satisfy the
utility requirement. See id. at 70, 82.
26. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
TRAINING MATERIALS, 37–39 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf [hereinafter
REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS]. Dr. George Elliott, director of Technology Center 1600 responsible
for examination of patent applications in the biotechnology and organic fields, acknowledged that the
revision represented a reversal in the Office’s position. Donald Zuhn, Kubin, Panel Questions
Motivation Behind Reversal in New Written Description Training Materials, PATENT DOCS, Jan. 8,
2009,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/01/kubin-panel-questions-motivation-behind-reversal-in-newwritten-description-training-materials.html.
27. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–39 (“[I]n this example there is no general
knowledge in the art about activity X to suggest that general similarity of structure confers the activity.
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requirement has been upheld by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board).28 However, the issue has not been considered
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).
Notably, the Federal Circuit recently upheld a rejection by the
Board for a percent identity claim to a genus of nucleic acid
molecules encoding the protein Natural Killer Cell Activation
Inducing Ligand (NAIL) wherein the protein binds CD48.29 The
Board had affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of the claim as both
obvious and lacking written description in the specification.30
However, the Federal Circuit chose to affirm the decision of the
Board based solely on the obviousness rejection31 and therefore did
not address the sufficiency of the disclosure under the written
description requirement.32
This Note examines application of the Patent Act disclosure
requirements to percent identity claims. Part I of this Note reviews
and discusses the development of the disclosure requirements and
their application to genetic sequences.33 Part II of this Note analyzes
the application of these disclosure requirements to percent identity
claims.34 This analysis first evaluates the severability of the written
Accordingly, one of skills in the art would not accept the disclosure of SEQ ID NO: 2 as representative
of other proteins having activity X.”).
28. The Board reviews ex parte appeals from adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(2008). Prior to 2006, the Board had not upheld any rejections of percent identity claims based on a
failure to satisfy the written description requirement. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 45, 83.
29. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
30. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
31. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1361. While sidestepping the written description issue, the court
nevertheless sent shockwaves with its decision. The Kubin court concluded that the Supreme Court had
essentially overturned the obviousness standard set forth in In re Deuel, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1216 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1358. The Deuel court had determined that a protein does not
always render the DNA encoding that protein obvious, even if it was obvious to try. Deuel, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1216. The Kubin court held that the ruling in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007), “cast doubt on the viability of Deuel” and subsequently found that claims to the cDNA
encoding NAIL were obvious since the prior art disclosed the existence of the protein. In re Kubin, 561
F.3d at 1358, 1361.
32. This silence despite evident interest at oral argument could be considered sub silentio approval of
the written description rejection and the approach taken in the Revised Training Materials. Kevin E.
Noonan, Gene Patenting and the Wisdom of Judge Lourie, PATENT DOCS, Apr. l2, 2009,
http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/04/gene-patenting-and-the-wisdom-of-judge-lourie.html;
see
also
Zuhn, supra note 26.
33. See discussion infra Part I.
34. See discussion infra Part II.
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description and enablement requirements35 and then explores the
effect of omitting the functional limitation in sequence identity
claims on the enablement requirement.36 Part III of this Note argues
that identifying genetic sequences by percent identity without a
functional limitation is adequate disclosure of the genus.37
I. BACKGROUND
In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must file with her
application a specification that fully discloses the invention to assure
that the public receives a quid pro quo in exchange for the limited
monopoly the patent grants to the inventor.38 This disclosure
requirement of the Patent Act of 1952 is codified in the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112,39 which, according to current
interpretation of the statute,40 requires that the disclosure (1) contain
an adequate written description of the invention; (2) enable one to
make and use the invention; and (3) disclose the inventor’s best mode
of carrying out the invention.41 The Patent Office and courts are using
the first two disclosure requirements—written description and
enablement—to prevent overreaching by inventors beyond the quid
pro quo the public receives for granting the limited monopoly.42

35. See discussion infra Part II.A.
36. See discussion infra Part II.B.
37. See discussion infra Part III and Conclusion.
38. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[D]escription [of
the invention] is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful disclosure in
exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”); 3 CHISUM,
supra note 17, § 7.01.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.”).
40. See discussion infra Part II.A.
41. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.01 (“Under Section 112, . . . the inventor must adequately set forth
and describe three items: (1) the invention (the description requirement); (2) the manner and process of
making and using the invention (the enablement requirement); and (3) the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention . . . .”).
42. Id.
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A. Written Description Requirement
The written description requirement first appeared in the Patent
Act of 1793.43 At that time, patents did not contain claims, so the
written description served to both enable the invention and provide
notice to the public of what the inventor was claiming as his
invention.44 This notice function of the written description
requirement put the public “in possession” of the scope of the
claimed invention.45 However, with the Patent Act of 1870, this
notice function was achieved by the claims instead of the
specification.46 Thus, with the advent of claims, the “written
description” language of the Patent Act was presumed for many
decades to constitute superfluous words not distinct from the
enablement requirement.47
The written description requirement was reborn in 1967 with the In
re Ruschig decision.48 The applicants in Ruschig attempted to add a
new claim that was not fully supported by the specification to their
application a year after it had been filed.49 Rather than reject the
claims as new matter under § 132 of the Patent Act,50 however, the
court “calved a new [written description] doctrine out of the § 112
enablement requirement.”51 The court later distinguished these two
43. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836) (“[E]very inventor, before he
can receive a patent, . . . shall deliver a written description of his invention . . . in such full, clear, and
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known . . . .”).
44. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting)
(citing Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822)); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of
the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615,
619–20 (1998).
45. Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977; Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 434; Mueller, supra note 44, at 620.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”);
see also Enzo, 323 F.3d at 977; 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 8.01; Mueller, supra note 44, at 620.
47. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (finding only two requirements in
§ 112: enablement and best mode); see also In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 594 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Rich, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the words “written description” were “of ancient lineage and, in spite of the
fact they are inappropriate to some situations, they were preserved, in writing the Patent Act of 1952,
because they were familiar and had many times been construed”); Mueller, supra note 44, at 620.
48. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
49. Id. at 991.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”).
51. Enzo, 323 F.3d at 978.
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sections as distinct and not interchangeable.52 Even so, the policy of
this new written description requirement appeared to prevent
inventors from later claiming more than they had invented at the time
the application was filed.53 The Federal Circuit followed this
precedent and applied the judicially created written description
requirement strictly to later filed or amended claims that sought the
benefit of the priority date of an earlier filed specification.54
In 1997, however, the court in Lilly applied the written description
requirement for the first time to original claims without any priority
question.55 The patents at issue in Lilly were based on the cloning of
the insulin gene, which, as discussed above, was a breakthrough that
opened the way to modern methods of insulin production.56
Nevertheless, while the claims in Lilly recited vertebrate,
mammalian, and human insulin cDNA,57 only rat insulin cDNA was

52. In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (arguing that § 132 “prohibits the
introduction of new matter into the disclosure of an application,” while § 112, “[the] first paragraph,
requires that claim language be supported in the specification”).
53. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979 (“[T]he § 112 doctrine, like its corollary § 132, policed priority,
nothing more.”); Mueller, supra note 44, at 621.
54. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Adequate description of
the invention guards against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in
such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.”
(quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))); In re Wright, 866 F.2d
422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[The] essence of the so-called ‘description requirement’ of § 112, first
paragraph” involves inquiring whether “newly claimed subject matter was described in the patent
application when filed.”).
55. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also
Enzo, 323 F.3d at 979–80 (arguing that the court for the first time applied the written description
requirement “as a general disclosure doctrine in place of enablement, rather than as a priority doctrine”);
Mueller, supra note 44, at 633 (noting that Lilly was a departure from prior written description cases
because the court applied the requirement to original claims rather than to claims presented or amended
after the application filing date, and the court set a significantly higher standard for biotechnology
inventions by requiring an express disclosure in the specification of the nucleic acid sequence for DNA
claims).
56. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562; see also supra note 2.
57. Cells use the DNA sequence of a gene as a template to produce (transcribe) messenger
ribonucleic acid (mRNA), which is complementary to the DNA sequence from which it is transcribed.
HARVEY F. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 120–22 (6th ed. 2008). Cells may then use the
mRNA produced to synthesize a protein encoded by the mRNA sequence. Id. However, unlike DNA,
RNA is unstable. AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR BIOTECHNOLOGY 305–06 (Michael Wink ed.,
2006). Thus, scientists use the viral enzyme reverse transcriptase to do the reverse process—that is to
produce a DNA complement from the mRNA. Id. This DNA is referred to as complementary DNA
(cDNA). Id.
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exemplified in the specification.58 While the court conceded that the
specification provided a process for obtaining the human insulinencoding cDNA,59 it nevertheless concluded that the specification did
not provide a written description of human, mammalian, or vertebrate
insulin cDNA.60 The court opined that “a method of preparing a
cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA encodes, as the
example does, does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.” 61 The
court likewise determined that “a description of rat insulin cDNA is
not a description of the broad classes of vertebrate or mammalian
insulin cDNA.”62 While this case has been heavily criticized as
creating an unprecedented “super-enablement” requirement for DNAbased inventions,63 the court was in fact building on past precedent
indicating a reluctance to grant broad protection to biotechnology
inventions absent structural descriptions.
For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the
patent at issue recited claims to a DNA sequence encoding human
erythropoietin (EPO).64 It was conceded that Amgen was the first
company to isolate the EPO gene and produce recombinant EPO for
therapeutic use.65 The defendants asserted, however, that Amgen’s
claims were invalid under § 102(g)66 based on prior invention by one
of their scientists who was allegedly first to conceive the strategy for
isolating the EPO gene.67 In response, the court opined that invention
58. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562.
59. Id. at 1567.
60. Id. (arguing that the specification provided “only a general method for obtaining the human
cDNA” based on the amino acid sequences of human insulin A and B and the method used to obtain the
rat cDNA; it thus did not provide a description of the cDNA encoding human insulin, whether or not the
disclosure was enabling).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1568.
63. E.g., Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4; Mueller, supra note 44, at 633.
64. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Erythropoietin
protein stimulates the production of red blood cells and is therefore a “useful therapeutic agent in the
treatment of anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone marrow production of
red blood cells.” Id. at 1203.
65. Edmund L. Andrews, Ruling May Hurt Amgen’s Rights to Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at
D1.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . before such person’s
invention thereof, the invention was made . . . by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it.”).
67. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1205.
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of a gene occurs when it is actually isolated in cases where “an
inventor is unable to envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as
to distinguish it from other materials.”68
Likewise, in Fiers v. Revel, the court went on to hold that “[a]n
adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere
statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential
method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA
itself.”69 The Lilly court relied on the Fiers holding to find that
written description of a genus of genetic sequences can be achieved
by “recitation of a representative number of [sequences] within the
scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to
the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial
portion of the genus.”70 The court later confirmed that these rules
apply “[r]egardless [of] whether a compound is claimed per se or a
method is claimed that entails the use of the compound.”71
The court has, however, made some concessions to the Lilly
written description requirement. On rehearing, the court in Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. reversed its prior decision and held
that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository
constitutes adequate written description of the deposited material.72
Moreover, the Enzo court clarified that functional limitations can
satisfy the written description requirement if they are “coupled with a
known or disclosed correlation between function and structure.”73
68. Id. at 1206 (“Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure of the
chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or
whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal
biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because an alleged conception having no more
specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that biological
property.”).
69. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court further clarified the holding in
Amgen, finding that “conception only of a process for making a substance, without conception of a
structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute a conception of the substance
claimed as a process.” Id. at 1169.
70. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
72. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (arguing that deposit
makes the contents of nucleotide sequence accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in
written form).
73. Id. at 964 (adopting the standard described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing
that an invention is complete).
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The court has further held that adequate written description can occur
absent working examples or actual reduction to practice.74 Likewise,
the written description requirement does not require recitation of
known structures or sequences.75
With these guideposts in mind, the Board recently chose to uphold
a rejection of a percent identity claim containing a functional
limitation as lacking sufficient written description, even though the
skilled artisan76 admittedly could have made and used the full scope
of the claim through routine experimentation.77 Citing Enzo, the
Board opined that the specification may have met the written
description requirement if the functional limitation—binding to
CD48—had been coupled with a disclosed or known correlation
between the function and structure.78 Interestingly, even though the
genus of nucleic acids was primarily defined structurally based on
sequence identity, the Board nevertheless argued that “[w]ithout a
correlation between structure and function, the claim does little more
than define the claimed invention by function.”79
The Patent Office’s position in the Training Materials suggests
that a valid percent identity claim becomes invalid when further
limited in scope to a subgenus of genetic sequences having a
particular function.80 Nevertheless, the Patent Office alluded in the

74. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
75. Id. at 1366–67. “Lilly does not set forth a per se rule that whenever a claim limitation is directed
to a macromolecular sequence, the specification must always recite the gene or sequence, regardless of
whether it is known in the prior art.” Id. at 1367; see also Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (holding that prior cases do not require a re-description of what is already known).
76. The “person skilled in the art” referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 112 is a legal fiction—similar to the
“reasonable person” found in the common law of torts—representing a hypothetical person having
knowledge in the particular technical field (art) without being a genius. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 17,
§ 8.03(3); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.03 (8th ed., rev. 8 July 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm.
77. Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (“[An] invention may be enabled
even though it is not described.” (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921
(Fed. Cir. 2004))).
78. Id. at 1417.
79. Id.
80. Compare Claim 1 with Claim 2 in Example 11A of REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note
26, at 37–39.
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Training Materials to the possibility that percent identity claims could
also raise enablement issues.81
B. Enablement Requirement
To be patentable, “the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable
correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification
to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”82 In order for a patent
specification to enable a claimed invention, one skilled in the art must
be able to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention based
on the disclosures in the specification, coupled with information
known in the art, without undue experimentation.83
Whether undue experimentation is needed to practice the claimed
invention is not determined by analyzing a single factor, but rather by
weighing many factual considerations.84 For example, although the
quantity of experimentation necessary is a factor to be considered by
the court,85 it is not dispositive “since a considerable amount of
experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine.”86 Similarly,
the patent specification can omit what is well known in the art87 even
though the amount of direction or guidance presented is an important

81. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 41.
82. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Fisher, 427
F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
83. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed Cir. 1986); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That some experimentation is necessary does not preclude enablement;
the amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive.”).
84. The Wands court set forth the following factors for consideration: “(1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary [i.e., time and expense], (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,
(3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and
(8) the breadth of the claims.” Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (citing Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547
(B.P.A.I. 1986)). However, it is not necessary that every enablement analysis consider all of these
factors. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.
85. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212.
86. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. 804, 807 (B.P.A.I. 1982)).
87. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1384 (“[A] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well
known in the art.”); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The question is whether the disclosure is sufficient to enable those skilled in the
art to practice the claimed invention, hence the specification need not disclose what is well known in the
art.”).
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consideration.88 Moreover, whereas the presence or absence of
working examples is relevant to an enablement inquiry,89 the
specification does not have to include actual embodiments or
examples to be enabling.90
A claim can be rejected, however, under the “how-to-use” aspect
of the enablement requirement if it is so broad as to cover inoperative
embodiments.91 While a claim does not have to specifically exclude
all possible inoperative embodiments to be enabled,92 the claim may
be invalid if the number of inoperative embodiments forces the
skilled artisan to use undue experimentation to identify those
embodiments that are functional and covered by the claim in order to
practice the invention.93
II. ANALYSIS
A. Separating the Written Description and Enablement Requirements
1. Are the Written Description and Enablement Requirements
Severable?
While there is some argument whether the court in Ruschig in fact
discerned a separate written description requirement severable from
the enablement requirement,94 a panel of the Federal Circuit in Vas88. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
89. Id.
90. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Nothing more than objective enablement is
required, and therefore it is irrelevant whether this teaching is provided through broad terminology or
illustrative examples.”).
91. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.03(7)(c). As part of the quid pro quo in the form of an enabling
disclosure, “an applicant must provide sufficient assurance that at least substantially all of the
compounds within a generic claim are useful.” Id. (citing In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357 (C.C.P.A.
1960)).
92. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (arguing that there is nothing wrong with claims
reading on vast numbers of inoperative embodiments so long as the skilled artisan could determine
utility without unreasonable effort).
93. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Of course, if the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of
ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might
indeed be invalid.”).
94. Principal Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 24–27, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248).
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Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar cited Ruschig for this position95 and held that
there was a distinct written description requirement that must convey
that, as of the filing date, the inventor was “in possession” of the
invention.96 Nevertheless, the court applied this separate requirement
only to later-filed claims that sought the benefit of the priority date of
an earlier-filed specification.97 Therefore, the court was using this
judicially recognized written description requirement as an
alternative to a new matter rejection98 and not to determine the
adequacy of the disclosure for original claims.99
As this statutory interpretation did not create any new, substantive
limitations but instead applied existing new matter requirements, the
validity of the Ruschig and Vas-Cath interpretations was not of
critical concern. In Lilly, however, the Federal Circuit, for the first
time, invalidated an original claim for lack of written description,
thereby recognizing a new substantive requirement.100 For that
reason, the issue of whether the statute can be correctly read to
contain a separate written description requirement has become
critically important.
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that “[t]he specification shall contain a
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
95. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he severability of [the]
‘written description’ provision from its enablement (‘make and use’) provision was recognized . . . as
early as In re Ruschig.”).
96. Id. at 1563–64 (“[W]e hereby reaffirm, that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a ‘written
description of the invention’ which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The
purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and
use’; the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the
filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”).
97. Id. at 1560 (“[T]he ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play where claims
not presented in the application when filed are presented thereafter. Alternatively, patent applicants
often seek the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed . . . application . . . for claims of a later-filed
application.”).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”); 4 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 11.04 (“An applicant may amend an application’s specification
or drawings after the application is filed,” but may not insert into the application new matter that
involves a departure from or an addition to the original disclosure).
99. Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560 (“The question raised by these situations is most often phrased
as whether the application provides ‘adequate support’ for the claim(s) at issue; it has also been analyzed
in terms of ‘new matter’ under 35 U.S.C. § 132.”).
100. Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 5.
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enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”101
Judicial proponents of a separate written description requirement read
the statute to require “a written description of the invention” that is
separate from the requirement that the disclosure “enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”102 Others, however,
view the “written description of the invention” as the means for
enabling the skilled artisan to make and use the invention and not as a
separate requirement.103 The Federal Circuit recently agreed to finally
consider this question en banc104 where it reaffirmed that 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 contains a written description requirement separate from
enablement.105
2. What is the Difference?
Whether the statute supports a separate, substantive written
description requirement is an important question because the
requirement set forth in Lilly and reaffirmed in Ariad creates a
heightened disclosure standard that is more difficult to apply than
enablement without providing the public additional quid pro quo
benefits.106
101. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
102. E.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J.,
concurring with denial of rehearing en banc) (“The statute states that the invention must be
described . . . . [W]hen the statute began requiring claims, it was not amended to delete the requirement;
note the comma between the description requirement and the enablement provision, and the ‘and’ that
follows the comma.”); see 35 U.S.C. § 112.
103. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The sufficiency of [the] written description
[requirement] . . . depends solely on whether it enables any person skilled in the art to which the
invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention . . . .”); Enzo, 323 F.3d at 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo, 323 F.3d at 988 (Linn, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (“35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a written description of the invention, but the
measure of the sufficiency of that written description . . . should depend solely on whether it enables any
person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to make and use the claimed invention.”).
104. The Federal Circuit granted en banc rehearing to reconsider the severability, scope, and purpose
of the written description requirement. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). The parties were requested to file new briefs addressing (1) “[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 1, contains a written description requirement separate from an enablement requirement” and
(2) if so, “what is the scope and purpose of the requirement.” Id.
105. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106. Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 69 (2000)
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Critics have viewed the Lilly written description requirement as a
“super enablement” standard for biotechnology inventions because it
requires a description of the invention beyond that which is required
to enable the skilled artisan to make and use the invention.107 For
example, citing Fiers v. Revel, the Lilly court stated that an adequate
written description of a DNA “requires a precise definition, such as
by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties.”108
Importantly, this bright line rule increases the disclosure
requirements for DNA sequences without taking into account the
quantity or quality of the experimentation necessary to obtain the
sequences.109 In contrast, such a disclosure could be sufficient to
enable the invention if undue experimentation would not be
required.110
For enablement, the finder of fact weighs several objective factors,
such as the predictability of the art and the relative skill of those in
the art, to determine whether practicing the claimed invention at the
time the application was filed would have required undue
experimentation.111 In contrast, to determine whether the written
description requirement was met, the finder of fact must determine
whether the inventor was in possession of the invention at the time
the application was filed based entirely on the patent specification
and knowledge in the art.112
(“Proponents of the written description requirement have yet to explain exactly what benefits the
requirement provides that are not already provided by the enablement requirement.”).
107. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he
only way to distinguish the Lilly rule from enablement is to construe Lilly as requiring more disclosure
than necessary to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the invention, a ‘super-enablement’
standard. Interpreting Lilly in those terms, however, presents severe consequences for biotechnology.”);
Mueller, supra note 44, at 617 (“The Lilly court’s elevation of written description to an effective ‘super
enablement’ standard of uncertain scope and applicability will likely chill development in this critically
important technology field and frustrate the . . . patent system’s policy goal of encouraging prompt
disclosure of new inventions.”).
108. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers
v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993)).
109. See id.
110. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed Cir. 1986); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
111. See, e.g., Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
112. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/6

16

Giles: How to Claim a Gene: Application of the Patent Disclosure Require

2011]

HOW TO CLAIM A GENE

711

For example, if a DNA sequence was already known in the art,
such evidence would be applicable to the sufficiency of both written
description and enablement. However, in evaluating the written
description, the finder of fact would have to ignore evidence that the
skilled artisan could have determined the sequence of additional
DNA variants using routine methods. Thus, even if every single
variant covered by the claim could be sequenced and tested for
function in a single week using routine skill, the written description
requirement might not be satisfied. It is for these reasons that the
Lilly possession test is viewed as representing a heightened disclosure
standard requiring “far more specific disclosure than enablement.”113
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit rejected the characterization that
the Lilly written description requirement is a “super enablement”
standard.114 Moreover, according to the Federal Circuit, the written
description requirement is part of the quid pro quo of a patent in that
it “allows the [Patent Office] to examine applications effectively;
courts to understand the invention, determine compliance with the
statute, and to construe the claims; and the public to understand and
improve upon the invention and to avoid the claimed boundaries of
the patentee’s exclusive rights.”115
Application of the written description requirement also has
procedural disadvantages. Importantly, whereas post-filing
publications may be used to show that the specification was enabling
in view of the state of the art at the time the application was filed,116
the court will not consider post-filing evidence when determining
adequacy of the written description.117 In other words, an inventor
113. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 981–82 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
114. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (arguing that the
court has always expressly permitted the disclosure of structural features common to members of the
genus (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
115. Id. at 1345.
116. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(allowing evidence of post-filing publications that demonstrated the extent of the enabling disclosure).
But see Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (indicating that
courts do not have to give post-filing evidence much weight).
117. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355 (“Because written description is determined as of the filing date . . .
evidence of what one of ordinary skill in the art knew [after the application was filed] cannot provide
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can use data gathered after the application was filed—demonstrating
that the invention works as claimed—to prove that his patent was
enabling. He cannot, however, use that same evidence to show he
was also in possession of the invention when the application was
filed.
3. Can the Lilly Written Description Requirement be Satisfied for
Generic DNA Claims?
An important issue to consider is whether the written description
requirement can ever be satisfied when applied to generic DNA
claims.118 According to the court in Enzo, functional limitations can
satisfy the written description requirement for claims to genetic
sequences if they are “coupled with a known or disclosed correlation
between function and structure.”119 This position is based on the
presumption that the more that is known about the structure of a
protein, the greater the ability to predict genetic variants that will
retain function.120 Nevertheless, no matter how much is known about
a protein’s structure, it is generally impossible to predict with
certainty the effect of a change in protein sequence—and thus
structure—on protein function.121
Since some amino acid residues within a protein are directly
involved in the activity of the protein, it is predictable that
substitution of these residues, especially non-conservative
substitutions,122 might affect protein function.123 On the other hand,
substantial evidence to the jury that the asserted claims were supported by adequate written
description.”).
118. See discussion supra note 14.
119. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the standard
described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing that an invention is complete).
120. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 42 (“[A]mino acid substitutions outside of the
two identified functional domains are unlikely to greatly affect activity Y.”).
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Christopher M. Holman in Support of Neither Party at
14–15, Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1248)
(“[D]espite recent advances in the field . . . protein engineering remains as much an art as it is a
science . . . because the rules defining sequence-structure-function relationships are still not well
understood.” (second and third alteration in original) (quoting PROTEIN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN vii
(Sheldon J. Park & Jennifer R. Cochran eds., CRC Press 2010))).
122. A conservative substitution is “the replacement in a protein of one amino acid by another,
chemically similar, amino acid . . . [which] is generally expected to lead to either no change or only a
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the sequence of a protein also determines how the amino acid
polymer folds into secondary and tertiary shapes, which in turn
affects the activity and stability of the protein.124 Therefore,
substitution of amino acid residues within the polymer can affect the
structure, and thus the activity or stability of the protein.125 While
experimental three-dimensional (3D) structures predicted from
crystallography studies greatly improve the ability to correlate protein
function and stability, these predicted structures are available for only
a small percentage of proteins.126 Moreover, efforts to predict protein
function based on changes in protein stability have so far failed to
provide a simple correlation between protein stability and function.127
In light of this uncertainly, a rational application of Lilly’s written
description requirement to genetic sequences may require that the
specification provide evidence that each and every sequence covered
under the claim be functional. If invention requires actual possession
by the inventor, rather than merely placing the public in possession of
the invention without undue experimentation, then it stands to reason
that no claim to a DNA or protein is valid if it were not first shown to
possess the desired function. Of course, such an application of the
Lilly written description standard could seem unduly strict in view of
the constitutional mandate to promote scientific progress,128 which
may be why the Enzo court attempted to reduce the impact of the
written description requirement.
Interestingly, the Enzo court relaxed the written description
requirement based on evidence that deposit of genetic sequences in a
public depository “makes its contents accessible to the public when it
is not otherwise available in written form.”129 Admittedly, “[t]he
practice of depositing biological material arose primarily to satisfy
small change in the properties of the protein.” DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY 97 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 1989).
123. Yana Bromberg & Burkhard Rost, Correlating Protein Function and Stability Through the
Analysis of Single Amino Acid Substitutions, 10 (Supp. 8) BMC BIOINFORMATICS, S8 (2009).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
129. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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the enablement requirement,” but the court extended this application
to written description even though the inventors did not know the
structure of the sequences.130 The court made this concession because
“[a] person of skill in the art, reading the accession numbers in the
patent specification, can obtain the claimed sequences from the . . .
depository by following the appropriate techniques to excise the
nucleotide sequences from the deposited organisms containing those
sequences.”131 Thus, while the deposit enabled the skilled artisan to
determine the structure of the genetic sequences without undue
experimentation, it did nothing to show that the inventors were
actually in possession of this structure when the application was
filed.132 The court nevertheless concluded that the written description
was satisfied.133
The court continued to apply enablement standards to relax the
written description requirement in Noelle v. Lederman, holding that
inventors can show possession of an antibody by disclosing the
antigen to which the antibody binds.134 The court came to this
conclusion based on the “well defined structural characteristics for
the five classes of antibody, the functional characteristics of antibody
binding, and the fact that the antibody technology is well developed
and mature.”135
The rulings in Enzo and Noelle have been correctly criticized as a
clear departure from the Lilly standard of requiring sufficient
structural disclosure of the claimed invention.136 More importantly,
these cases blur the distinction between these supposedly divergent
requirements by applying enablement standards in Lilly clothing.
This blurring continued in the Ariad en banc decision, where the
court identified a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of
disclosure for generic claims that are surprisingly similar to the In re
130. Id. at 965–66.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 966.
134. Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135. Id. (quoting Enzo, 323 F.3d at 964).
136. Wenrong Huang, Enzo’s Written Description Requirement: Can It Be an Effective Check Against
Overly Broad Biotechnology Claims?, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 13–14 (2006).
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Wands factors used to evaluate enablement.137 In identifying these
factors, the court was recognizing that “the level of detail required to
satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the
nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and
predictability of the relevant technology.”138 Therefore, the amount of
detail needed to satisfy the written description requirement will
depend upon similar factors to that of the enablement requirement,
albeit with different goals in mind.
4. Does the Lilly Written Description Requirement Protect the
Public?
Many commentators have defended the substantive written
description requirement set forth in Lilly based on public policy
reasons.139 These commentators appear to be reacting to a fear that a
select few will gain a monopoly over all of the valuable genes and
thereby hinder research and development.140 The economics of how
patent scope affects the progress of science, however, is actually
quite complicated.141 Courts, therefore, have used the disclosure
requirements to ensure that the scope of patent claims at least do not
137. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“For generic
claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the adequacy of disclosure, including ‘the
existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the
science or technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); cf. supra note 84 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Huang, supra note 136, at 14 (arguing that the written description requirement prevents the
granting of monopolies to inventors for something they did not invent); William C. Mull, Using the
Written Description Requirement to Limit Broad Patent Scope, Allow Competition, and Encourage
Innovation in Biotechnology, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 393, 421 (2004) (arguing that without Lilly, “an
applicant would be able to claim more than he invented simply by including the claims in the original
application”); Zhibin Ren, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description Requirement
and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1321 (1999)
(arguing that had the inventors in Lilly wanted to claim cDNA from other species, they could have
cloned and sequenced them); Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV.
537, 562–63 (1999) (arguing that upholding the claims would have rendered the species obvious,
effectively blocking others from obtaining patents on those molecules, which would have crippled the
biotechnology industry).
140. See supra note 136.
141. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 904–09 (1990); Mull, supra note 139, at 426–30.
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reach beyond the quid pro quo provided by the disclosure in
exchange for the government granted monopoly.142
Prior to Lilly, adequacy of disclosure in satisfying the quid pro quo
was evaluated in terms of enablement,143 which requires that the
inventor enable the full scope of the invention and thereby place the
invention into the public’s possession without undue
experimentation.144 In contrast, the written description requirement
demands that disclosure demonstrate that the inventor was in
possession of the invention at the time the application was filed.145
While there may be economic theories to support limiting the
scope of biotechnology patent claims to less than what was
enabled,146 these theories are not based on the traditional quid pro
quo concern.147 Instead, the Lilly court defended this strict application
of the disclosure requirement on the grounds that the description must
further demonstrate to the skilled artisan that the inventor “invented”
what is claimed.148
To understand how this “invention” standard benefits the public, it
is necessary to consider the context of the cases in which it was first
enumerated. Prior to Lilly, the written description requirement was
used to prevent applicants from amending their applications to claim
aspects of their invention that they had not originally described in the

142. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[D]escription [of
the invention] is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive meaningful disclosure in
exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time.”); 3 CHISUM,
supra note 17, § 7.01.
143. E.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note
18, at 6–8.
144. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Although not explicitly stated in section
112, to be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use
the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”).
145. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
146. See Mull, supra note 139, at 426–30; Merges & Nelson, supra note 141, at 904–09.
147. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (U.S. 1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated
by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public
from an invention with substantial utility.”).
148. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To fulfill the
written description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient
detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’”
(citing Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
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patent specification or original claims.149 In that context, the court
determined that it is not enough that a disclosure enable or make
obvious the later-claimed invention; it must also disclose the
invention sufficiently to support the conclusion that the inventor had
actually invented it at the time the disclosure was filed.150 For
example, if someone invents a doorknob and describes how to make
the doorknob out of wood, he would not be allowed a year later to
amend his application to recite that the doorknob could be made of
porcelain, even though a porcelain doorknob would be enabled and
considered obvious in view of his patented wooden doorknob.151
Therefore, this use of written description to police priority and new
matter amendments serves a purpose distinct from the quid pro quo
requirement of enablement—it prevents an applicant from claiming
improvements and specific embodiments she had not contemplated
when the application was filed. Importantly, this view does not
prevent an inventor from claiming a genus that covers multiple
embodiments if she has enabled the full scope of the genus; it does,
however, prevent her from later claiming a specific embodiment
covered by her genus claim that is merely obvious in view of her
disclosure of the genus.152
B. Claiming Genes that Do Not Work
Since it is possible that written description can be secured for
sequence identity claims by excluding a functional limitation from
149. See, e.g., Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72 (considering whether claims should receive the benefit
of an earlier filed application where the invention would have been obvious in view of the disclosure of
the prior application); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the
written description requirement is relevant to new claims not present in the application or in claims
seeking the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed application); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 991
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (considering the validity of a claim added to the application a year after it was filed to a
specific drug that was not disclosed in the specification).
150. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995 (“While we have no doubt a person so motivated would be enabled by
the specification to make [the claimed compound], this is beside the point for the question is not whether
he would be so enabled but whether the specification discloses the compound to him, specifically, as
something appellants actually invented.”).
151. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
152. A genus does not always anticipate or make obvious a species of that genus. Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wash., 334 F.3d 1264, 1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 1 CHISUM, supra note 17,
§ 3.02(2)(c).
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the claim,153 it is important to consider the impact of this claim
strategy on enablement.
Notably, the Board has shown a willingness to find enablement of
sequence identity claims when the functional limitation is
included.154 For example, the claims in Ex parte Kubin contained a
functional limitation, which limited the scope of the percent identity
claim to operable embodiments.155 The Board found that the percent
identity claims limited by a functional limitation lacked sufficient
written description.156 The court also concluded, however, that even
though the amount of experimentation needed to practice the full
scope of the invention might have been extensive, it would have been
routine based, inter alia, on the state of the art and the relative skill of
those in the art.157 The Board based this opinion on evidence that
methods of making the claimed nucleic acid sequences and screening
for activity were known in the art and described in the
specification.158
Therefore, for claims to a genus of genetic sequences reciting a
function for the proteins encoded by the sequences, the enablement
inquiry is whether the skilled artisan can make genetic sequences
within the structural scope of the claim and screen them for the
claimed function without undue experimentation.159
Since the purpose of the functional limitation is to expressly limit
the scope of the claimed sequences to those that are functional and to
thereby exclude inoperative embodiments, it is important to consider
the impact of omitting the function from the claims on the
enablement inquiry. A claim to a genus can be enabled even when it
153. Compare Claim 1 with Claim 2 in Example 11A of REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note
26, at 37.
154. See, e.g., Ex parte Abad, 2008 WL 904456, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 2008); Ex parte Kubin, 83
U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
155. Claim 73 recited: “An isolated nucleic acid molecule comprising a polynucleotide encoding a
polypeptide at least 80% identical to amino acids 22–221 of SEQ ID NO:2, wherein the polypeptide
binds CD48.” Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1412 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
156. Id. at 1416–17 (“While we conclude one skilled in the art would have been able to make and use
the full scope of [the invention] through routine experimentation, we find Appellants did not describe
the invention . . . sufficiently to show they had possession of the claimed genus of nucleic acids.”).
157. Id. at 1416.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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covers some inoperative embodiments.160 If, however, the number of
inoperative embodiments is so high that it forces the skilled artisan to
use undue experimentation to identify functional embodiments and
practice the invention, the claim will fail for lack of enablement.161
Therefore, for claims to a genus of genetic sequences that do not
recite a function for the sequence, the enablement inquiry is whether
the skilled artisan can make nucleic acids within the structural scope
of the claim and screen them for a function identified in the
specification without undue experimentation. Sound familiar? The
only apparent difference in the two enablement inquiries is that in the
first instance, the function is recited in the claim, and in the second
instance, a function is provided in the specification.162
Certainly, a difference in scope exists between these two types of
genus claims. A claim to a genus of genetic sequences that does not
recite a function most likely reads on inoperative embodiments such
that the inventor can exclude others from making and using genetic
sequences that do not have a use disclosed in the patent application.
For example, a claim to a genus of proteins having 95% sequence
identity to insulin will inevitably cover many protein variants that
would not be effective in treating diabetes.163 Moreover, were one to
later identify another novel use for one or more of those inoperative
insulin variants, such as the ability to repair cartilage,164 the genus
claim would still dominate that later invention even though the
inventor had not enabled a use for that insulin variant.
160. In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (arguing that there is nothing wrong with claims
reading on vast numbers of inoperative embodiments so long as the skilled artisan could determine
utility without unreasonable effort).
161. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Of course, if the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of
ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might
indeed be invalid.”).
162. The specification must provide a specific and substantial utility for the claimed invention. In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing that the claimed invention must provide a welldefined and particular benefit to the public as disclosed in its current form); Brenner v. Manson, 383
U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.”).
163. See Holman, Protein Similarity Score, supra note 10, at 72 n.70.
164. See Use of Insulin for the Treatment of Cartilagenous Disorders, U.S. Patent No. 6,689,747 (filed
Mar. 22, 2001).
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III. PROPOSAL
Inventors should consider claiming genetic inventions based on
sequence identity without reciting a function for the genetic variants
in the claim. While this approach will result in claims covering
genetic sequences that do not function according to the invention—
inoperative embodiments—the burden on the skilled artisan to
practice the invention with this approach is no more onerous than
when the function is recited.165 The fact that inclusion of the
functional limitation can cause otherwise patentable claims to
become invalid is a testament to the problems inherent with severing
enablement and written description standards.
A. Enablement is Enough
The Lilly written description requirement demands more than
placing the public in possession of the invention—it requires that the
disclosure demonstrate the inventor was in actual possession of the
invention at the time the application was filed.166 This additional
check on the patent system is based on the premise that inventors
should not be granted patents for things they did not invent;167 an
appealing proposition, on its face. Nevertheless, the public is equally
enriched either way since the enablement standard requires that the
public gain possession of the invention without undue
experimentation.
Consider the following hypothetical. Andy discovers gold using
his gold detector. He is able to prove that there is at least one ounce
of gold buried in the ground, but only additional digging will
determine the full scope of the treasure. He subsequently makes a

165. See discussion supra Part II.B.
166. Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Capon v. Eshhar, 418
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
167. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (“The description of the invention . . . sets forth what has been invented, and sets boundaries
of what can be claimed. . . . The dissent’s citation of cases . . . reinforces . . . the role of the description
of the invention in establishing what has been invented.”).
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contract168 with Bob to split the treasure if Bob does the digging. Bob
digs three feet down, as instructed, and finds a 100-ounce nugget of
gold. Should it matter whether Andy knew the exact amount of gold
beforehand? Bob is equally enriched regardless of whether Andy had
foreknowledge of the full scope of the treasure. Moreover, were we
to require more initial disclosure by Andy in order for him to enforce
his claim, he would be less inclined to contract with other prospectors
at the point when he first discovered the source of gold.
The proponents of the Lilly written description requirement would
presumably want Andy to forfeit his claim to his share of the
remaining ninety-nine ounces of gold since he only disclosed one
ounce. Applying these proponents’ public policy arguments, Andy
should not be able to claim the full scope of the treasure until he was
in “possession” of his discovery, i.e., until Andy could describe it
with structural detail.169 It would not satisfy them that Andy enabled
Bob to gain possession of the gold by identifying the location of the
gold and giving Bob a shovel.170 Rather, to protect his secret, Andy
should have determined how much gold was present before he started
handing out shovels.171
Of course, Lilly proponents claim they are protecting the public by
preventing prospectors from laying claim to all the treasure in the
ground prematurely.172 This concern, however, is unfounded, since
the claim has to place the public in possession of the full scope of the
treasure being claimed without undue experimentation.173 For
168. A patent can be viewed as a contract between the inventor and the public. Pickering v. Holman,
459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A patent is in the nature of a contract between the public and the
inventor . . . . The publication bar goes upon the theory that the idea is already in the public domain and
there can be no consideration offered in exchange for the grant of the monopoly.”).
169. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An
adequate written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .” (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1993))).
170. See Ren, supra note 139, at 1321 (arguing that had the inventors in Lilly wanted to claim cDNA
from other species, they could have cloned and sequenced them).
171. See id.
172. See Huang, supra note 139, at 14 (arguing that the written description requirement prevents the
granting of monopolies to inventors for something they did not invent); Mull, supra note 139, at 421
(arguing that without Lilly, an applicant would be able to claim more than he invented simply by
including the claims in the original application).
173. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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example, Andy would have a much harder time justifying his claim
had he merely told Bob that there was a precious metal somewhere
underground within a specified square mile and had only given Bob a
spoon to dig with.
Likewise, the role of the written description requirement
recognized in Ruschig and Vas-Cath provides a distinct role in
protecting the public. For example, if Bob is rewarded for his digging
efforts by finding diamonds in addition to gold, Andy would not be
heard to say he had a claim to the diamonds as well.174 Why can he
claim the additional amounts of gold but not the diamonds? A simple
answer is that he did not assert a credible claim to diamonds when
handing out the shovels.175 Someone specifically looking for
diamonds would not have been any closer to finding them based on
Andy’s claim. Moreover, had Andy tried to claim diamonds when he
only had evidence of gold, his claim would likely not have been
considered credible.176 Thus, the enablement standard is sufficient to
satisfy the quid pro quo disclosure requirement; whereas the written
description standard judicially recognized in Ruschig serves a limited
purpose in policing priority claims.177
Unfortunately, the court did not apply the enablement standard to
the claims rejected in Lilly.178 It is possible that in the early days of
biotechnology, finding homologous cDNAs in other mammalian
species was more akin to using a spoon than a shovel to dig for
treasure, and that the claims in those early cases were properly
rejected.179 Since then, however, cloning and sequencing methods

174. See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
175. The claims define “the invention for the purpose of applying the conditions of patentability”
determining infringement. 3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 8.01.
176. See Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (arguing
that plausibility of invention is not enough and that some data supporting the claimed invention is
necessary to enable an invention).
177. See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
178. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
179. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 980, n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (“In 1977, biotechnology was still in its infancy. In fact, the Maxam and Gilbert method of
sequencing DNA was just published in 1977. Cloning in that era was, at a minimum, unpredictable and
would have required vast amounts of experimentation to accomplish. Therefore, the patent’s prophetic
disclosure of human insulin cDNA hardly enabled its production as claimed. Instead of pursuing this
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have become more conventional.180 Therefore, the court should
ascertain the level of experimentation required for the public to gain
possession of the full scope of the invention since the inventor’s
possession at the time the application was filed does little for the
public.
B. Function Recited or Implied
In view of the Written Description Training Materials published by
the Patent Office181 and the application of this view by the Board,182
genetic sequences should be claimed based on percent identity to a
reference sequence without reciting the function of the genetic
sequence in the claim. Without the functional limitation, a genus of
genetic sequence based on sequence identity is defined entirely by
structure, which is alone sufficient to describe the invention.183 The
only problem with this approach is that the genus is likely to cover
inoperative embodiments based on the substitution of amino acid
residues critical for protein function or stability.184
However, the amount of experimentation necessary to avoid
inoperative embodiments covered by the claim when function is
omitted should be the same as the amount of experimentation
necessary to identify sequences that have the functional limitation
recited in the claim.185 For example, if Andy’s gold mine contains
both gold and pyrite,186 the amount of experimentation needed for
Bob to separate the gold from the pyrite is the same no matter how it
was claimed. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that sequence
obvious avenue of rejection, the Federal Circuit reached out beyond the statute and the case law to create
a new general disclosure test.”).
180. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
181. See REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–42.
182. See Ex parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1416–17 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
183. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (“An adequate written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties’ . . . .” (quoting Fiers v.
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993))).
184. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
185. See discussion supra Part II.B.
186. Interestingly, while the mineral pyrite is nicknamed “fool’s gold” due to its resemblance to gold,
iron pyrite has been found to have other—inventive—uses. See, e.g., Katherine Bourzac, Mining Fool’s
Gold for Solar: Cyrus Wadia is Using Abundant Materials to Grow Nanocrystals for Cheaper
Photovaltaics, 112 TECH. REV. 80 (Nov. 1, 2009); U.S. Patent No. 4,119,769 (filed Oct. 31, 1977).
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identity claims that do not recite a functional limitation can likewise
be enabled.
Importantly, the Board has been willing to find sequence identity
claims enabled when the genus of sequences are further limited to
those having a particular function.187 This willingness is based on the
understanding that undue experimentation is not required when
methods of making nucleic acid sequences covered by the claim and
methods of screening for those sequences having the desired activity
are sufficiently known in the art and described in the specification.188
C. Experimentation in the Genetic Age
The primary issue with sequence identity claims is that the number
of possible variants covered by the claim can be enormous.189 Even
allowing for a single amino acid change can result in millions of
possible genetic sequences covered by a claim.190 While it may be
reasonable for the skilled artisan to make a few genetic variants
covered by the claim and screen them for the desired function, it may
not be reasonable to ask that same person to test several thousand
variants. On the other hand, what was unreasonable yesterday may be
reasonable tomorrow due to technological improvements and
automation. That is why the court considers several factors in
determining whether a disclosure would require undue
experimentation.191 In In re Wands, the court set forth several factors
to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require
undue experimentation, including the amount of guidance in the
patent application, the state of the art, the relative skill of those in the
art, the predictability of the invention, and the breadth of the
claims.192

187. See, e.g., Ex parte Abad, 2008 WL 904456, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 2008); Ex parte Kubin, 83
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1416.
188. Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1416.
189. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
190. See id.
191. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Ex parte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547
(B.P.A.I. 1986)).
192. Id.
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Currently, even with the advancements made in the field of in
silico protein structure prediction, it is still generally impossible to
predict with certainty the effect that a change in protein sequence,
and thus structure, will have on protein function.193 Therefore,
whether a sequence identity claim is enabled will depend inter alia
upon the level of identity claimed, which determines the breadth of
the claim, and the nature of the assay for testing for activity.194 For
example, if a high-throughput assay can be used to test for function
of the genetic variants, a lower percent identity—a larger genus and
thus more non-functional variants—can be tolerated without undue
experimentation.195 In contrast, a higher percent identity—a smaller
genus—would be necessary where the invention requires in vivo
testing to determine whether a genetic variant has the desired
activity.196
CONCLUSION
It is reasonable for inventors of novel genes and recombinant
technologies to desire patent protection beyond the scope of the
specific genetic sequence they exemplify.197 Notably, it is becoming
increasingly simple for a competitor to engineer genetic variants that
preserve, or in some cases improve, the therapeutic efficacy of an
encoded protein in order to circumvent a patent.198 In contrast, while
simple to identify one variant, the number of such functional variants
is potentially so enormous that it is impractical—if not impossible—
for the inventor to recite each and every one.199 Nevertheless,
reasonable efforts by inventors to define genetic inventions in a

193. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
194. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See discussion supra Introduction.
198. Holman, Learning from Litigation, supra note 8, at 226–27; Holman, Protein Similarity Score,
supra note 10, at 57–60.
199. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

Published by Reading Room, 2011

31

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

726

[Vol. 27:3

manner that will prevent routine circumvention are being viewed as
overreaching.200
The patent disclosure requirements codified in the first paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 112201 are intended to prevent overreaching by
inventors beyond the quid pro quo the public receives for granting the
limited monopoly.202 Prior to 1997, the courts relied primarily on the
enablement requirement to invalidate overreaching claims.203
However, in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,204 the court for the first time invalidated an original, arguably
overreaching, claim for lack of written description.205 In doing so, the
court stated that an adequate written description of a DNA “requires a
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or
physical properties.”206 This bright line rule creates a heightened
disclosure standard that is more difficult to apply than enablement
without providing to the public additional quid pro quo benefits.207
Notably, the court has attempted to relax the stringency of this
requirement.208 These efforts have, however, involved application of
enablement principles to show possession by the inventor.209 This
blurring of the distinction between these supposedly divergent
requirements begs the question whether enablement and written
description are properly severable in the first place.210
One approach originally endorsed by the Patent Office211 to satisfy
the Lilly written description requirement for genetic inventions was
the claiming a genus of genetic sequences based on percent identity
to a reference sequence that is limited by a functional limitation.212
According to the court in Enzo, however, in order for functional
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See discussion supra Part I.A.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
3 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 7.01.
See discussion supra Part I; supra note 18.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Holman, Paper Tiger, supra note 18, at 4.
Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
See supra note 23.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
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limitations to satisfy the written description requirement, they must
be “coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function
and structure.”213 Consistent with this decision, the Patent Office
recently reversed its position and proposed that inclusion of a
functional limitation, which narrows the genus of genetic sequences
to those that produce a functional protein, actually increases the
burden on the specification to satisfy the written description
requirement by disclosing a correlation between structure and
function.214 This position is based on the presumption that the more
you know about the structure of a protein, the greater the ability to
predict genetic variants that will retain function.215 This, however,
may not be true since no matter how much is known about a protein’s
structure, it is generally impossible to predict with certainty the effect
of a change in protein sequence, and thus structure, on protein
function.216
Inventors should therefore consider defining genetic inventions
completely by structure without reciting the function in the claims.
While this approach will result in claims covering genetic sequences
that do not function according to the invention—inoperative
embodiments—the burden on the skilled artisan to practice the
invention with this approach is no more onerous than when the
function is recited.217 That is because the amount of experimentation
for the skilled artisan to avoid inoperative embodiments—when the
function is omitted—is identical to the amount of experimentation
necessary to identify functional variants when function is recited in
the claim.218 Either way, the skilled artisan must make variants
defined structurally by the claim and then use an assay to test the
variants for the desired function. The fact that the written description

213. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc, 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the standard
described in the Written Description Guidelines for showing that an invention is complete).
214. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 37–39.
215. REVISED TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 42 (“[A]mino acid substitutions outside of the
two identified functional domains are unlikely to greatly affect activity Y.”).
216. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
217. See discussion supra Part II.B.
218. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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standard treats these two situations so differently is another testament
to the problems inherent with severing these standards.
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